From John Nash’s pioneering work on non-cooperative games to the mind blowing Gale-Shapley algorithm, Nobel Prizes in economics are piling up in the field of Game theory with however little understanding from the masses and little high impact engineering applications. EQRC has taken active interest in this field and is currently building several applications in the area of “Stable matching”.
More specifically EQRC has developed couple of prototypes in the form of a website called Oolalaaa and one phone application called Stable Match. However various other applications at various levels of complexity in different industries are currently studied. If you are an investor and are interested in what we are doing, feel free to contact us.
Symbol of strategy throughout the ages and throughout border chess is considered by many the ultimate strategy game. The presence of this chess player is really symbolic since EQRC does not focus on any direct application of chess but rather focuses on Game Theory more specifically the engineering applications of Nash equilibrium.
“We had been having a crush on each other for 4 years but when we met the timing was not right. Lucie was coming out of a long seriously relationship and I was not mature enough. We had been unfortunately stuck into this friend zone and would have never been able to get out of it if it wasn’t for Oolalaaa.”
– Brian and Lucie
About our Oolalaaa Website
Oolalaaa is the first and the only dating website which uses both the concept of stable matching (explained more in details further down below) and also the only dating website which redistributes some of its earnings back to the users of the website. It is also the only dating website that uses the “princess dilemma”. These concepts are explained by the videos on the right.
About our Stable Match Application (currently under development)
“Stable Match” is essentially our app version of Oolalaaa without the monetary aspect nor the flexibility to use the prisoners dilemma but the added benefits of simplicity and familiarity with Tinder like apps. The term “Stable matching” is a fancy game theory jargon which essentially means that we match people based on their mutual preference in such a way that the match which is given to them is the best match they can achieve at the present time given the choices of other people in the system. For example imagine you are the average Joe and that you are interested in two people on this planet. One of these people is a famous celebrity who is herself in love with another celebrity which you are unaware off. The second person who you are interested in is your neighbor. Oolalaaa & Stable Match both allows you to formalize your secretive rankings in a user friendly way while protecting your privacy. For example in this situation you would input the celebrity as your number 1 choice and your neighbor as your second choice. Provided your neighbor’s ranking is also favorable to such stable matching, the website would send both of you an email stating that you are each other’s stable match. In no circumstance your neighbor which is now your partner would realize that you had selected the celebrity as number 1 and that she is essentially your backup plan. Dignity is preserved, time saved and humiliation avoided.
About Stable Matching
In mathematics, economics, and computer science, the stable marriage problem (also stable matching problem or SMP) is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized sets of elements given an ordering of preferences for each element. A matching is a mapping from the elements of one set to the elements of the other set. A matching is stable whenever it is not the case that both the following conditions hold.
– There is an element A of the first matched set which prefers some given element B of the second matched set over the element to which A is already matched, and
– B also prefers A over the element to which B is already matched.
About the Princess Dilemma
The princess dilemma also known as the secretary problem is a famous problem of optimal stopping theory. The basic form of the problem is the following: imagine an administrator willing to hire the best secretary out of n rankable applicants for a position. The applicants are interviewed one by one in random order. A decision about each particular applicant is to be made immediately after the interview. Once rejected, an applicant cannot be recalled. During the interview, the administrator can rank the applicant among all applicants interviewed so far, but is unaware of the quality of yet unseen applicants. The question is about the optimal strategy (stopping rule) to maximize the probability of selecting the best applicant. If the decision can be deferred to the end, this can be solved by the simple maximum selection algorithm of tracking the running maximum (and who achieved it), and selecting the overall maximum at the end. The difficulty is that the decision must be made immediately.